

Dismantling the Beast

Formally Proving Access at Scale in AWS

Mohit Gupta & Nick Jones

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TL;DR:

IAM is complex

IAM is hard generally, but it's exponentially harder when managing across very large organizations

IAMSpy – Library to simplify AWS IAM Processing

SMT Solver – “Can entity X do action A against resource R?”
Precomputed models for efficiency

Future extensions

Explain: “here's why IAMSpy says yes/no” - “yes, but [condition X]”
The rest of the AWS IAM model – session policies etc

Who Are We?

Mohit Gupta



Senior Security Consultant

Nick Jones



Principal Security Consultant
Cloud Security Lead

Why is IAM such a
hard problem?

Background

Organizations are doing more cloud(s)

Complexity of cloud providers

Increased complexity vs legacy systems

That complexity increases year on year



AWS...



... and also Azure...

GENERAL / [DASHBOARD](#)

Dashboard

13,905

ACTIONS

Number of known actions within the Azure RBAC service.



13,905

API METHODS

Number of known API methods within all of Azure.



331

BUILT-IN ROLES

Number of built-in roles provided by Azure.



... And Google Cloud

GENERAL / [DASHBOARD](#)

Dashboard

5,938

IAM ACTIONS

Number of known IAM actions within Google Cloud IAM.



8,411

API METHODS

Number of known API methods within all of Google Cloud.




1,065

PREDEFINED ROLES

Number of predefined roles provided by Google Cloud.




It's Complex...



*A session principal is either a role session or an IAM federated user session.

It's Complex...




<https://aws.plainenglish.io/aws-iam-role-chaining-df41b1101068>

...Because It Needs To Be



System Complexity


Hundreds of services, thousands of actions, all needed to make the platforms work.



Principle of Least Privilege

We need to *be able to* scope down to the bare minimum permissions, even if no one does.

Real World Impacts



<https://github.com/ramimac/aws-customer-security-incidents>

<https://speakerdeck.com/ramimac/learning-from-aws-customer-security-incidents>

Clearly, we're not the first to get here



IAM-Hunter




Image from <https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/architecture/new-whitepaper-provides-best-practices-for-optimizing-aws-accounts/>

IAMSpy

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HOW STANDARDS PROLIFERATE:
(SEE: A/C CHARGERS, CHARACTER ENCODINGS, INSTANT MESSAGING, ETC)



Image from <https://xkcd.com/927/>

SMT Solvers

Is This Satisfiable?

Satisfiability = “is this formula true for a given set of variables?”

Why Is This Useful?

Build a data model, ask whether entity A can do thing B against resource C

Limitations

For efficiency, pre-compute models
Not everything always satisfiable in IAM

Complexity's a Killer

Results only as good as the model you build
More inputs and variables, more likely the model is wrong.

Zelkova

Semantic-based Automated Reasoning for AWS Access Policies using SMT


John Backes, Pauline Bolignano, Byron Cook, Catherine Dodge, Andrew Gacek,
Kasper Luckow, Neha Rungta, Oksana Tkachuk, Carsten Varming
Amazon Web Services

Can IAM Entity E do Action A to Resource R?

IAMSpy's core value proposition

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IAMspy





IAM Graphing & Visualisation

IAMSpy does the heavy lifting on policy resolution, leaves tool to focus on core visualisation value



CI/CD Regression Testing


Unit testing to validate that X will always be able to do Y, or never be able to do Z



Detection and Response Support

What is the blast radius of this particular entity? How bad is it?

Demo Time!



Where Next?

Broader Support

- SCPs
- Permissions boundaries
- Session Policies

Explain

- **WHY** can entity X do A to resource R?
- **HOW** can entity X do A to resource R?

Yes but...

- You **COULD** do this if you abide by these conditions



Conclusions

IAM Is Hard...

Lots of breaches compounded by misconfigured IAM

...But It Has To be


Complexity of cloud services requires this level of configurability

SMT Solvers Are AN option

But they're not the only one, and have their limitations

IAMSpy is a Building Block

We hope this will allow people to build cool IAM tooling more quickly and easily



Open Sourcing...

IAMSpy

- Released by EoD tomorrow, watch for announcement in fwd:cloudsec slack

iam-hunter

- Released within 2 weeks, watch for announcement in fwd:cloudsec slack

Cloud Knowledge Base

- <https://secwiki.cloud> – our internal cloud knowledge base



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