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WiFi Security: Wireless Weaknesses and Router Rooting

Nick Jones and Dan Clifford

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Who Are We?

+ MWR InfoSecurity – A global, independent, research-led cyber security consultancy
+ Global – Offices in UK, South Africa, Dubai, Singapore, New York
+ Research-led – industry leaders producing novel research on interesting topics
+ Cyber security consultancy – working with our clients to secure their systems and applications

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Why Are We Awesome?

+ Consultants present at Black Hat, DEF CON, Troopers, SyScan, 44Con and many others
+ Multiple Pwn2Own and Mobile Pwn2Own wins
+ HackFu - Internal two-day team information security challenge
+ MWRICON - Internal conference

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Why Are We Awesome?



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

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Why Are We Awesome?

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Plan of Attack

+ Intro
+ MAC address filtering/SSID hiding
+ Encryption Primer
+ WEP
+ WPA/WPA2
+ WPS
+ Once you’re inside, then what?

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A Disclaimer and Word of Warning

+ Don’t scan or attack anything you don’t own
+ Computer Misuse Act 1990

Potentially 14 years in jail!

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What is WiFi?

+ IEEE 802.11 - Wireless LAN physical layer
+ A radio standard for transmitting and receiving data
+ Point to point - everything goes through AP
+ Half-duplex - bi-directional but only one way at a time

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Why Do We Care?

+ Over 5 billion WiFi devices shipped by 2013[1]
+ 73.3% of UK households had WiFi in 2011[2]
+ Number of Wi-Fi hotspots is increasing

[1] https://www.abiresearch.com/press/growing-demand-for-mobility-will-boost-global-wi-f
[2] http://www.strategyanalytics.com/default.aspx?mod=pressreleaseviewer&a0=5193

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WiFi Security Protocols

+ Wired Equivalent Protocol (WEP)
+ Wireless Protected Access (WPA)
+ Wireless Protected Access II (WPA2)
+ Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS)

+ Media Access Control (MAC) address filtering
+ Hidden Service Set Identifiers (SSIDs)

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Non-Technical Security

+ Encryption and authentication only part of the story
+ Weak passphrases ruin strong encryption
+ Evil Twin attacks - Fake APs that look like what the user or device expects

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MAC Address Filtering

+ Whitelist of MAC Addresses

MAC Address Spoofing

+ Listen for connected devices
+ Set your MAC address to match a connected device
+ ????
+ Profit!

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Hidden SSIDs

+ Stops your network showing up on an OS’s network list
+ Not actually hidden, router will broadcast SSID in response to relevant probes
+ Easy to disassociate a client and watch for reconnect
+ Security by obscurity, it doesn’t work

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Encryption



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Stream Ciphers

+ Acts on a single bit at a time
+ Uses a pseudo random key stream
+ Key stream generated by CSPRNG
+ RC4, Salsa20



Image from http://hyperploid.blogspot.co.uk/2010/08/digital-ciphers.html

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Block Ciphers

+ Acts on a fixed number of bits per cycle
+ Several different modes of operation
+ DES/3DES, AES, Blowfish, Twofish



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WEP

- Wired Equivalent Protocol, defined in the first IEEE 802.11 draft
- WEP-40 used 10 hex digit keys, WEP-104 used 26
- 24-bit Initialisation Vector
- RC4 stream cipher
- CRC-32 checksum
- Shared Key

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...Is Broken

+ Officially deprecated by IEEE in 2004
+ Game-breaking flaws in the cryptography
+ Do not use WEP - Windows 8 won't allow it

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Cracking WEP

+ Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir attack
+ Stream ciphers require unique keys
+ IVs are used to introduce this uniqueness

+ 24-bit IVs aren't long enough
+ 16,777,216 distinct values
+ 50% probability IV repeats after 5000 packets

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Hands-on WEP Cracking

Use airmon-ng to enter monitor mode

+ sudo airmon-ng start [WIRELESS INTERFACE]

Use airodump-ng to capture packets

+ airodump-ng --ivs --channel [X] --essid [ESSID HERE] -w [OUTPUT FILE PREFIX]

Use aircrack-ng to crack the WEP key

+ aircrack-ng -e [ESSID] [OUTPUT FILE FROM AIRODUMP]

Use aireplay-ng to spoof ARP packets and generate a tonne of IVs

+ aireplay-ng -3 -b [AP MAC ADDRESS] -h [CLIENT MAC ADDRESS] [INTERFACE]

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WPA

+ A subset of Draft IEEE 802.11i
+ Stopgap measure between WEP and WPA2

+ Uses RC4 with TKIP
+ Requires only a firmware upgrade
+ Common for PCs, Rare for APs

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TKIP

+ Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
+ Uses a per packet key
+ Generated by mixing rather than concatenation
+ Adds a counter to prevent replay attacks
+ Message Integrity Check (MIC)

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…Is Still Fairly Broken

+ There are security concerns[1]
+ It is not strictly broken
+ Deprecated by the IEEE
+ RC4 has several serious attacks against it (NOMORE, Bar-Mitzvah, FMS)
+ NSA, GCHQ and other state actors are expected to have broken RC4 completely

[1] http://arstechnica.com/security/2008/11/wpa-cracked/

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WPA2

+ Wi-Fi Protected Access II
+ Defined in IEEE 802.11i-2004
+ Uses CCMP and AES

+ This is what you should be using

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CCMP

+ Counter Mode CBC-MAC Protocol
+ "Counter Mode Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol"
+ WPA2's equivalent of TKIP

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WPA Personal Mode

+ WPA-PSK (Pre-shared Key)
+ 256-bit Key
+ Can be entered as 64 Hexadecimal digits, more commonly as 8 to 63 ASCII characters
+ PBKDF2 - SSID is used as a salt
+ Password Based Key Derivation Function 2
+ Susceptible to weak password attacks, rainbow tables exist

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WPA Enterprise Mode

+ 802.1x
+ RADIUS
+ MS-CHAP



Image from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:802.1X_wired_protocols.png

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Hands-On WPA Attacks

Use airmon-ng to enter monitor mode

+ sudo airmon-ng start [WIRELESS INTERFACE]

Use airodump-ng to capture four way handshake

+ airodump-ng --channel [X] --essid [ESSID HERE] -w [OUTPUT FILE PREFIX] [INTERFACE]

Use aireplay-ng to force a handshake - -0 is deauth, 1 is number of deauths to send

+ aireplay-ng -0 1 -a [ACCESS POINT MAC] -c [MAC OF CLIENT TO DEAUTH] [INTERFACE]

Use aircrack-ng to perform a dictionary attack and recover the key

+ aircrack-ng -w [PASSWORD LIST] -b [ACCESS POINT MAC] [AIRODUMP OUTPUT FILE]

Kali has password lists in /usr/share/wordlists, wfuzz's common.txt is a good place to start

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WPS

+ Wi-Fi protected setup
+ For home and small business Wi-Fi
+ Designed to make it easier to connect new users to secure networks
+ Several modes of operation: PIN, Push-Button, NFC, USB (Deprecated)

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...Is Broken Too

+ WPS uses an 8 digit PIN
+ 8th digit is a checksum - 7 digits to guess
+ PIN is verified in two rounds, first half then second half
+ Only need to guess from 11000 PINs

+ Can be cracked in ~4 hours by brute force guessing PINs
+ Should be disabled, but not all home routers allow you to

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Cracking WPS

Use airmon-ng to enter monitor mode

+ sudo airmon-ng start [WIRELESS INTERFACE]

Use wash to spot networks vulnerable to WPS brute forcing

+ wash -i [MONITOR INTERFACE]

Use reaver to brute force the WPS pin

+ reaver -i [MONITOR INTERFACE] -c [CHANNEL] -b [MAC OF AP] -vv

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We’re In, Now What?

+ Default passwords for router admin panels
+ Man-In-The-Middle attacks - ARP poisoning, SSLStrip
+ Router vulnerabilities

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Poor Password Choices

+ Router manufacturers often do not randomise default admin passwords
+ Usually something like admin/admin, admin/password
+ Dictionary attacks using THC Hydra or similar usually effective

```
hydra -l [USERNAME] -P [PASSWORD LIST] -t 10 -m /
192.168.0.1 http-get
```

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Man In The Middle

+ Tell everyone you’re the router, watch traffic come pouring in
+ No security at all on ARP traffic
+ Forward on all traffic while capturing
+ Filter for interesting stuff with Wireshark
+ SSLStrip will redirect SSL connections

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Router Vulnerabilities

+ Many run an embedded Linux variant
+ Security flaws in the firmware and web interfaces are very common
+ Remote code execution vulnerabilities also not uncommon
+ Admin interface web servers often run as root
+ Vendors often slow to patch, if at all

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Thank You for Listening

Questions?