DETECTING SOPHISTICATED THREAT ACTORS IN AWS

Alfie Champion
Nick Jones




AGENDA






RIP PERIMETER






CLASSIC ORGANISATION






MODERN ORGANISATION









INITIAL VECTORS













ATTACK SURFACE





ATTACK SURFACE







ATTACKER OBJECTIVES






ATTACK PATHS







ATTACK PATHS







WAR STORIES #1

Misconfigured
IP registration User
Whitelisting on SSO Permissions

Admin
Access



WAR STORIES #2


Compromise On-Prem AD

Add User to SSO Access to Administrator Security Group AWS Access Console

Add User to SSO Access to Administrator S\$\$



CAPITAL ONE BREACH





EC2 Instance Metadata



Exploit

```
ec2-user@ip-192-168-221-53:~$
    curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
ami-id
ami-launch-index
ami-manifest-path
block-device-mapping/
events/
hostname
identity-credentials/
instance-action
instance-id
instance-id
instance-type
local-hostname
local-ipv4
```





Int. Recon

List Buckets

```
alfie@mwr-alfie:~ aws s3 ls
2019-09-05 15:10:33 firenose-bucket-logs-12345
2019-02-09 23:41:07 remote-state-cloud-detection
2019-09-05 14:47:39 tf-bucket-logs-12345
```



Sync 700+ S3 Buckets



Objective

alfie@mwr-alfie:/tmps aws s3 sync s3://tf-bucket-logs-12345 test-data/
download: s3://tf-bucket-logs-12345/Awstogs/255556442723/CloudTrail_ap-northeast-1/2019/09/05/299338442723_Cl
oudTrail_ap-northeast-1_20190905T1700Z_I8N1FnYiHf32mt4E.json.gz to test-data/AWSLogs/299338442723/CloudTrail/
ap-northeast-1/2019/09/05/299338442723_CloudTrail_ap-northeast-1_20190905T1700Z_I8N1FnYiHf32mt4E.json.gz
download: s3://tf-bucket-logs-12345/AWSLogs/299338442723/CloudTrail/ap-northeast-1/2019/09/05/299338442723_Cl
oudTrail_ap-northeast-1_20190905T1705Z_H0l5Npr4Sj6PrQRG.json.gz to test-data/AWSLogs/299338442723/CloudTrail/
ap-northeast-1/2019/09/05/299338442723_CloudTrail_ap-northeast-1/2019/09/05/299338442723_Cl
oudTrail_ap-northeast-1_20190905T1355Z_R8EFIHTEXRQQNkU1.json.gz to test-data/AWSLogs/299338442723/CloudTrail/
ap-northeast-1/2019/09/05/299338442723_CloudTrail_ap-northeast-1_20190905T1355Z_R8EFIHTEXRQQNkU1.json.gz
download: s3://tf-bucket-logs-12345/AWSLogs/299338442723/CloudTrail/ap-northeast-2/2019/09/05/299338442723_Cl
oudTrail_ap-northeast-2/2019/09/05/299338442723_Cl
oudTrail_ap-northeast-2/2019/09/05/299338442





ON-PREMISE











CLOUD











CLOUD











WHATARE PROVIDERS DOINGABOUT IT?

















































Amazon GuardDuty



Amazon Inspector







Lambda
























▼ Data events

Data events are logs of resource operations performed on or within a resource. These are also known as data plane operations. Additional charges apply. Learn more

S3 Lambda

You can record S3 object-level API activity (for example, GetObject and PutObject) for individual buckets, or for all current and future buckets in your AWS account. Additional charges apply. Learn more

Filter by bucket or prefix				Showing 1	I of 1 resources
Bucket name	Prefix	~	Read	▼ Write ▼	
Select all S3 buckets in your account 1			Read	Write	
tf-bucket-logs-12345	/test-data		Read	Write	

▶ September 5th 2019, 18:21:03.276 s3.amazonaws.com	Get0bject	tf-bucket-logs-12345	test-data/dataAug-16- 2019.json
▶ September 5th 2019, 18:21:03.276 s3.amazonaws.com	GetObject	tf-bucket-logs-12345	test-data/dataSep-5- 2019.json
▶ September 5th 2019, 18:21:03.276 s3.amazonaws.com	GetObject	tf-bucket-logs-12345	test-data/dataJuly-27- 2019.json





PRIOR RESEARCH


















ON-PREMISE EQUIVALENTS

ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	College	4rol	Exfiltration	Impact
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript			Automated Exfiltration	Data Destruction
Exploit Public-Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	Binary Padding	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Softv			Compressed	Data Encrypted for Impact
External Remote Services	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	BITS Jobs	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Com Object Mr			crypted	Defacement
Hardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	Applnit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery	Exploitation Servi		ΙK	ize Limits	Disk Content Wipe
Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	Applnit DLLs	Application Shimming	Clear Command History	Credentials in Files	File and Directory Discovery	Logon			Alternative	Disk Structure Wipe
Spearphishing Attachment	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	CMSTP	Credentials in Registry	Network Service Scanning	Pass the	$\Delta \Pi$	&(]k	Command Channel	Endpoint Denial of Service
Spearphishing Link	Execution through API	Authentication Package	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Exploitation for Credential Access	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Tic	* 1 1	\sim 0 i	TM Over Other	Firmware Corruption
Spearphishing via Service	Execution through Module Load	BITS Jobs	Dylib Hijacking	Compile After Delivery	Forced Authentication	Network Sniffing	Remote Deskto Protocol			on Over Physical Medium	Inhibit System Recovery
Supply Chain Compromise	Exploitation for Client Execution	Bootkit	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Compiled HTML File	Hooking	Password Policy Discovery	Remote File Copy	ь		Scheduled Transfer	Network Denial of Service
Trusted Relationship	Graphical User Interface	Browser Extensions	Extra Window Memory Injection	Component Firmware	Input Capture	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Services	Input Capture	т чираск Channels		Resource Hijacking
Valid Accounts	InstallUtil	Change Default File Association	File System Permissions Weakness	Component Object Model Hijacking	Input Prompt	Permission Groups Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Man in the Browser	Multi-hop Proxy		Runtime Data Manipulation



MINDSET SHIFT









UNCERTAINTY OF MALICIOUS INTENT



CONTEXT IS KEY









CODIFY ATTACKS













Exploit

C2

Persistence

Int. Recon

Lat. Mov.

Objective

DETECTION FIDELITY






















```
h.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/dev/enumeration/enumerate_cloudtrails_for_current_region'
nick@DESKTOP-RG0SK17:~$ curl -s -X GET "https://n@
 -H "accept: application/json" -H "x-api-key: Kba
                                                                                   ·cx" | jq .
  "trailList":
     "Name": "leonidas-target-trail",
     "S3BucketName": "leonidas-target-bucket",
     "S3KeyPrefix": "prefix",
     "IncludeGlobalServiceEvents": true,
     "IsMultiRegionTrail": true,
     "HomeRegion": "us-east-1",
     "TrailARN": "arn:aws:cloudtrail:us-east-1:573816966241:trail/leonidas-target-trail",
     "LogFileValidationEnabled": true,
     "HasCustomEventSelectors": false,
     "IsOrganizationTrail": false
 ],
 "ResponseMetadata": {
   "RequestId": "397f3c4b-f6f3-43e6-8c5b-de6b4c01bf8e",
   "HTTPStatusCode": 200,
   "HTTPHeaders": {
     "x-amzn-requestid": "397f3c4b-f6f3-43e6-8c5b-de6b4c01bf8e",
     "content-type": "application/x-amz-json-1.1",
     "content-length": "371",
   },
    "RetryAttempts": 0
    DESKTOP-RGASK17 .~ $
```







BUILD PROCESS






CODE GENERATION

```
- name: Enumerate Cloudtrails for Current Region
  permissions:
```

- cloudtrail:DescribeTrails

```
input_arguments:
    executors:
        python:
        code: |
            client = boto3.client('cloudtrail')
            response = client.describe_trails()
            return response
```





CODE GENERATION

```
- name: Enumerate Cloudtrails for Current Region
    permissions:
    - cloudtrail:DescribeTrails
    input_arguments:
    executors:
        python:
        code: |
            client = boto3.client('cloudtrail')
            response = client.describe_trails()
            return response
```



CODE GENERATION

- name: Enumerate Cloudtrails for Current Region
 detection:

```
sources:
    name: "cloudtrail"
    attributes:
        eventName: "DescribeTrails"
        eventSource: "*.cloudtrail.amazonaws.com"
```



DOCUMENTATION GENERATION

Persistence

T1501 - Add an API key to an existing user

T9000 - Modify User Account

T1501 - Add an API key to an existing user

Add API key to existing user

An adversary may attempt to maintain access by creating an API key attached to an existing privileged user

Required Permissions

iam:CreateAccessKey

Required Parameters

user - str

IAM user to generate the API key for

Attacker Action

aws iam create-access-key --user-name [user]

Detection Case

When logs are ingested into ELK, the following Lucene query can be used to identify relevant events.

eventName:CreateAccessKey AND eventSource:iam.amazonaws.com

Table of contents

Add API key to existing user

Required Permissions

Required Parameters


user - str

Attacker Action

Detection Case




CONTINUOUS TESTING








TERRASIEM











CROSS-REGION CLOUDTRAIL











REDUCING BLAST RADIUS










GEO IP ENRICHMENT







③

8

IAM Key Events

New Users Created


Access Keys Created

Users added to Administrators Group





						1–39 of 39 🔇 🕽
Time ₩	sourceIPAddress	eventName	geoip.country	geoip.city	requestParameters.userName	requestParameters.groupName
August 27th 2019, 09:31:29.000	5.148.34.186	ConsoleLogin	GB	Maida Vale	-	-
August 15th 2019, 01:11:50.000	109.231.195.254	ConsoleLogin	GB	Crowborough	-	
• August 15th 2019, 01:11:34.000	109.231.195.254	ConsoleLogin	GB	Crowborough	-	•
July 16th 2019, 21:39:28.000	85.255.237.65	ConsoleLogin	GB		-	-
July 5th 2019, 10:42:50.000	5.148.34.186	ConsoleLogin	GB	Maida Vale	•	•
June 26th 2019, 13:59:45.000	109.231.195.254	ConsoleLogin	GB	Crowborough		
June 25th 2019, 18:22:22.000	109.231.195.254	ConsoleLogin	GB	Crowborough	-	-
June 10th 2019, 19:45:12.000	109.231.195.254	ConsoleLogin	GB	Crowborough	•	
May 7th 2019, 13:38:42.000	5.148.34.186	ConsoleLogin	GB	Maida Vale		




IAM Key Events

w Users Created

Access Keys Created


Users added to Administrators Group





	Time	sourceIPAddress	eventName	geoip.country	geoip.city	requestParameters.userName	requestParameters.groupName
•	September 17th 2019, 15:13:30.331	37.157.204.105	ConsoleLogin	PL	Warsaw	-	-
•	September 17th 2019, 13:52:33.601	37.157.204.105	ConsoleLogin	PL	Warsaw	-	
•	September 6th 2019, 09:02:14.265	5.148.34.186	ConsoleLogin	GB	Maida Vale	-	
•	September 5th 2019, 20:00:10.483	81.157.2.115	UpdateAccessKey	GB	Bristol	alfie	-
•	September 5th 2019, 19:57:49.999	81.157.2.115	CreateAccessKey	GB	Bristol	alfie	-
•	September 5th 2019, 19:57:49.999	81.157.2.115	AddUserToGroup	GB	Bristol	nick	Administrators
•	September 5th 2019, 19:57:49.999	81.157.2.115	RemoveUserFromGroup	GB	Bristol	nick	Administrators

	Augus								
	▶ Augus								
	▶ Augus								
	▶ July 16		85.255.237.						
	▶ July 5ti		_{5.148.34.18} userIde	ntity.sessionCon	text.attribute	s.mfaAuthent	ticated QQ 🗆 🗱	false	
	▶ June 2		109.231.195.254	ConsoleLogin	GB	Crowborough	-	-	
	▶ June 2								
0	▶ June 1								
₽	▶ May 7	th 2019, 13:38:42.000	5.148.34.186	ConsoleLogin	GB	Maida Vale		-	_





VPC FLOW LOGS


Filter events

Message

2019-09-05 14:51:22

- 2 870081948864 eni-0f61bb7c7df6cf46a 91.189.92.20 192.168.221.53 443 35480 6 7 4615 1567695082 1567695112 ACCEPT OK
- 2 870081948864 eni-0f61bb7c7df6cf46a 91.189.92.19 192.168.221.53 443 36816 6 341 497461 1567695082 1567695112 ACCEPT OK
- 2 870081948864 eni-0f61bb7c7df6cf46a 195.170.224.235 192.168.221.53 58636 80 6 3 140 1567695082 1567695112 ACCEPT OK
- 2 870081948864 eni-0f61bb7c7df6cf46a 91.189.95.15 192.168.221.53 80 52684 6 7 4967 1567695082 1567695112 ACCEPT OK
- 2 870081948864 eni-0f61bb7c7df6cf46a 192.168.221.53 195.170.224.235 80 58164 6 1 40 1567695082 1567695112 ACCEPT OK
- 2 870081948864 eni-0f61bb7c7df6cf46a 192.168.221.53 195.170.224.235 80 58636 6 1 40 1567695082 1567695112 ACCEPT OK
- 2 870081948864 eni-0f61bb7c7df6cf46a 192.168.221.53 18.130.123.69 22 57000 6 209 20293 1567695082 1567695112 ACCEPT OK
- 2 870081948864 eni-0f61bb7c7df6cf46a 192.168.221.53 185.5.16.119 80 12629 6 1 40 1567695082 1567695112 ACCEPT OK
- 2 870081948864 eni-0f61bb7c7df6cf46a 192.168.221.53 91.189.92.19 36816 443 6 40 2750 1567695082 1567695112 ACCEPT OK
- 2 870081948864 eni-0f61bb7c7df6cf46a 18.130.123.69 192.168.221.53 57000 22 6 233 174665 1567695082 1567695112 ACCEPT OK
- 2 870081948864 eni-0f61bb7c7df6cf46a 91.189.94.4 192.168.221.53 123 37970 17 1 76 1567695082 1567695112 ACCEPT OK
- 2 870081948864 eni-0f61bb7c7df6cf46a 192.168.221.53 91.189.95.15 52684 80 6 6 503 1567695082 1567695112 ACCEPT OK








CROSS-ACCOUNT LOG ENRICHMENT

```
function decorateRecords (records, mapping) {
 console.log(`Decorating ${records.length} records`);
   let eniData = find(mapping, { 'interfaceId': record['interface-id'] });
   if (eniData) {
     record['security-group-ids'] = eniData.securityGroupIds;
     if (isRfc1918Address(record['destaddr']) && isRfc1918Address(record['srcaddr'])){
         record['direction'] = 'internal'
     } else if (record['destaddr'] == eniData.ipAddress) {
         record['direction'] = 'inbound';
     else {
         record['direction'] = 'outbound';
     record['publicIpAddress'] = eniData.publicIpAddress;
     record['instance-tags'] = eniData.instanceTags;
     record['instance-id'] = eniData.instanceId
     console.log(`No ENI data found for interface ${record['interface-id']}`);
   console.log(`${JSON.stringify(record)}`);
 console.log(`Finished with ${records.length} records`);
 return Promise.resolve(records);
```





CROSS-ACCOUNT LOG ENRICHMENT

```
⊕ ⊖ □ *
   instance-tags
                                    "Value": "".
                                    "Key": "purpleteam"
                                    "Value": "",
                                    "Key": "mailserver"
                                    "Value": "".
                                    "Key": "auto"
                                    "Value": "builder",
                                    "Key": "owner"
                                    "Value": "Mail server",
                                    "Key": "Name"
                                    "Value": "purpleparty.club",
                                    "Key": "domain"
                               A }

♠ Q □ ★ eni-047549eb7e888c664

t interface-id
                     ⊕ ⊖ □ * OK
t log-status
# packets
                     QQ * 7
# protocol
                     ⊕ ⊖ □ * 6
t publicIpAddress
                     Q Q □ ★ 54.149.214.79
t result
                     ⊕ Q □ * 0k
t security-group-ids @ Q II * Mail-purpleparty.club
t srcaddr
                     Q Q □ * 192.168.188.148
# srcport
                     ⊕ Q □ * 22
② start

♠ ♥ □ ★ October 9th 2019, 12:13:09.000
```




CROSS-ACCOUNT LOG ENRICHMENT

Time 🔻		srcaddr	srcport	destaddr	dstport	direction
▶ Septembe	er 5th 2019, 16:26:53.000	192.168.221.53	33,408	192.168.92.66	110	internal
▶ Septembe	er 5th 2019, 16:26:53.000	192.168.221.53	36,216	192.168.92.66	1,723	internal
▶ Septembe	er 5th 2019, 16:26:53.000	192.168.221.53	32,978	192.168.92.66	995	internal
▶ Septembe	er 5th 2019, 16:26:53.000	192.168.221.53	39,424	192.168.92.66	80	internal
▶ Septembe	er 5th 2019, 16:26:53.000	192.168.221.53	39,408	192.168.92.66	25	internal
▶ Septembe	er 5th 2019, 16:26:53.000	192.168.221.53	56,846	192.168.92.66	3,306	internal
▶ Septembe	er 5th 2019, 16:26:53.000	192.168.221.53	57,420	192.168.92.66	23	internal
▶ Septembe	er 5th 2019, 16:26:53.000	192.168.221.53	55,450	192.168.92.66	993	internal
▶ Septembe	er 5th 2019, 16:26:53.000	192.168.221.53	36,232	192.168.92.66	1,723	internal
▶ Septembe	er 5th 2019, 16:26:53.000	192.168.221.53	57,436	192.168.92.66	23	internal
▶ Septembe	er 5th 2019, 16:26:53.000	192.168.221.53	55,080	192.168.92.66	111	internal
▶ Septembe	er 5th 2019, 16:26:53.000	192.168.221.53	57,156	192.168.92.66	53	internal
▶ Septembe	er 5th 2019, 16:26:53.000	192.168.221.53	48,626	192.168.92.66	21	internal
▶ Septembe	er 5th 2019, 16:26:13.000	192.168.221.53	48,544	192.168.92.66	22	internal
▶ Septembe	er 5th 2019, 16:26:13.000	192.168.221.53	39,424	192.168.92.66	80	internal




WHERE NEXT?

EXPAND LEONIDAS




AUTOMATED RESPONSE







CONCLUSIONS





CONCLUSIONS

