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COMMUNITY DAY

NORDICS

2023







Securing AWS Estates at Scale

Nick Jones | 2023-04-20









aws sts get-caller-identity

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- Principal Consultant @ WithSecure
- AWS Community Builder
- Previously presented at:
 - fwd:cloudsec
 - RSA Conference
 - Disobey, CitySec Mayhem, T2.fi
 - +++







Agenda

- **Common Misconceptions**
 - Real World Breach Scenarios
- What We See
 - Key Security Controls
 - Getting The Most From External Security Testing



COMMUNITY DAY


Security's Idea of Cloud















Real World Security

Attackers look for the easiest path

- Most attacks are opportunistic
- The basics helps stop APTs

Most people get screwed by basics:

- Public S3 buckets
- Forgotten AWS accounts
- Leaked credentials
- AdministratorAccess everywhere

You probably won't get breached by:

- Encryption at rest
- Not using the Nitro Enclaves etc
- Zero days
- AWS Insider threat

Real World Breach Scenarios





Breach Dataset



- Curated dataset of AWS related security incidents
- https://github.com/ramimac/aws-customer-security-incidents

Highlights

- 45 breaches back to 2014
- 21 incident reports
- Ignores S3 buckets too many to count!





Inherently Flawed Data

Not all breaches get spotted

Providers hate talking about it

Focus on low hanging fruit





A note on Zero Days

Cool but mostly irrelevant

- >120 vulns, 1 exploited ITW, no breaches reported
- https://www.cloudvulndb.org

Expect this to change

- Wiz, LightSpin, Orca + others doing lots here
- Watch fwd:cloudsec 2022 keynote from Wiz





Open S3 buckets

The perennial problem

- Biggest source of breaches
- Trivial to find and exploit


Situation is Improving

- AWS offers options to prevent
- Enable block public buckets everywhere!









Leaked/stolen credentials



Credentials



Verizon DBIRs say ~70% of cloud breaches

Some fun options:

- Credentials in public repositories
- Insider threat / former employees
- Phishing!





Credential Management

People Problems

- Disgruntled current/former employees/contractors
- Hard to prevent insider threat
- Proper leaver management really important!

Secrets management

- Credentials in repositories
- Shared passwords





44%*


Breaches involving IAM users



^{*} At least, given ambiguity of dataset







Other Interesting Attack Vectors





Identity Platforms / SSO

- Okta, Ping, OneLogin, Auth0…
- Single point of access
- Supply chain risk too

Interesting security properties

- MFA, Conditional Access Policies...
- Often poor session management
- Get the session token, get everything



token to

authenticate

Objective

Cloud Style Shell Popping!

Steal their SSO

session token



the target using?

SSM!

get shells on EC2

instances



Source Code Management

Everyone uses GitHub or similar to develop and collaborate on their code

CI/CD


Continuous integration and continuous delivery to automate testing and deployment of cloud workloads

Dev Usability > Security

Enabling dev velocity often means system architectures and controls are not well hardened

Automatic IaC Deployments

laC changes often automatically deployed after merging – can we bypass approvals process?





DevOooops

ObjectiveAdmin access over production



Malicious Insider

Default developer access

Access GitHub

Find some interesting IaC repositories

Malicious Pull Request

Exploit Terraform Cloud's operating model


Exfiltrate Credentials

Grab the credentials
Terraform Cloud
uses to deploy





Identity Management







Production Access

Reduce the Need for Human Production Access

Robust observability and CI/CD fast enough to use for emergency fixes

Deploy Production Access Control

Provide a hardened access mechanism, audit log everything, require approval

Ingest PAC Logs into Security Monitoring

Monitor PAC audit logs, review against incident tickets

1/2/3



Secrets Management

Often the key point of failure

Where do applications store their secrets?

How are credentials shared and rotated?

How do you know when secrets are leaked?

Use Secrets Manager / SSM Parameter Store!

Security Testing Done Right







"Penetration Testing" in AWS

App Assessment/Pentest

OWASP Top 10

Business logic flaws

API flaws



Cloud configuration review / "pentest"

Configuration mistakes

IAM permission review

Network layout/SG hardening etc



"Penetration Testing" Mostly Sucks

Driven by audits, not threats

Cloud engineering moves too fast

Low return on investment









What To Do Instead?



Automate

Leverage automation to drive as much security as possible





02 IaC Scanning

Scan Infrastructure as Code in pipelines

Checkov **TFLint**

Configuration

Assess resources for configuration issues

Prowler **ScoutSuite**



Secrets Scanning



Scan repositories for keys, certificates etc

TruffleHog detect-secrets

IAM 03

Identify IAM misconfigurations

Cloudsplaining **Pmapper IAM Spy**





Human-led reviews






Objective-Driven Assessments

Business targets

- Steal key data/IP
- Move money
- Deploy malicious code to prod

Realistic starting points

- Leaked access keys
- Compromised dev/insider threat
- Application compromise





Don't Buy a Red Team

You probably don't need one

- All about stealth, validating detection and response
- Depth, not breadth

Red Teaming is the final step

- Confirm and harden your attack surface
- Build your detection and response
- Test hardening, detection & response collaboratively
- ... then maybe a red team!



Collaborating with Security Consultants



If You're Going to Buy a Penetration Test...



Make it work for you

- Fit their testing and reporting into your workflows
- Push for deep advice and long-term solutions

Find a good partner

- Do they get AWS/Cloud/DevOps?
- Can they show you novel R&D?
- · Use engineers to vet providers' technical knowledge




Help Us Help You!



- Give us read access to the AWS accounts
- If you're using IaC, show us that too

Work with us

- Help us understand what you've built
- Show us problems, help us design solutions
- Stay engaged and communicative with testers



Conclusions









Security of the cloud extends to include a lot of external factors



Focus on IAM (especially users!), secrets management and CI/CD



Leverage automation and be smart about how you use humans



If you want to go fast, go alone.

If you want to go far, go together.

-- African Proverb







Thank you!

https://twitter.com/nojonesuk + https://www.nojones.net











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Code Snippet





Section Title





Two columns







Comparison







Three column







Four column with graphics







Six section with graphics



